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Abstract
This paper develops a threshold-augmented dynamic multi-country model (TG-
VAR) to quantify the macroeconomic effects of Covid-19. We show that there exist
threshold effects in the relationship between output growth and excess global volatility
at individual country levels in a significant majority of advanced economies and in
the case of several emerging markets. We then estimate a more general multi-country
model augmented with these threshold effects as well as long term interest rates, oil
prices, exchange rates and equity returns to perform counterfactual analyses. We dis-
tinguish common global factors from trade-related spillovers, and identify the Covid-19
shock using GDP growth forecast revisions of the IMF in 2020Q1. We account for sam-
ple uncertainty by bootstrapping the multi-country model estimated over four decades
of quarterly observations. Our results show that the Covid-19 pandemic will lead to
a significant fall in world output that is most likely long-lasting, with outcomes that
are quite heterogenous across countries and regions. While the impact on China and
other emerging Asian economies are estimated to be less severe, the United States, the
United Kingdom, and several other advanced economies may experience deeper and
longer-lasting effects. Non-Asian emerging markets stand out for their vulnerability.
We show that no country is immune to the economic fallout of the pandemic because
of global interconnections as evidenced by the case of Sweden. We also find that long-
term interest rates could fall significantly below their recent lows in core advanced
economies, but this does not seem to be the case in emerging markets.
JEL Classifications: C32, E44, F44.
Keywords: Threshold-augmented Global VAR (TGVAR), international business
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1 Introduction
There is no doubt that the rapid spread of Covid-19 across the world and policy measures
adopted to slow it down (including through isolation, lockdowns, and widespread closures)
have led to large negative economic shocks, not experienced before. The adverse economic
effects of the pandemic at individual country levels have also become accentuated by trade
and financial linkages that have been on the rise since the Second World War. Unlike a
typical macroeconomic disturbance, the Covid-19 shock and policies implemented to contain
it have brought about simultaneous disruptions to demand and supply in a totally new
economic environment, where consumers and firms are faced with additional uncertainties
about the disease itself (its spread, possible cure and vaccine development).
On the supply side, infections reduce labor supply and productivity; and lockdowns,
business closures and social distancing cause supply disruptions. On the demand side, layoffs
and the loss of income (frommorbidity, quarantines, and unemployment) and worse economic
prospects reduce household consumption and firms’investment. The extreme uncertainty
about the path, duration, magnitude, and impact of the Covid-19 pandemic could pose
a vicious cycle of dampening business and consumer confidence and tightening financial
conditions, which could lead to job losses and investment cuts in expectation of lower future
aggregate demand. Countries or regions that rely heavily on oil revenues, tourism, and
exports of goods and services are particularly vulnerable. Moreover, domestic disruptions
could spill over to other countries through trade, financial, and global value chain linkages,
intensifying the initial macroeconomic effects. The severity of the Covid-19 shock and the
heterogeneity of its outcome across different sectors of the economy and population groups
also present new methodological challenges, and shed doubts on the validity of standard
log-linearized approximation routinely used in the empirical macroeconomic modelling.
A rapidly growing literature investigates the macroeconomic effects of Covid-19. McK-
ibbin and Fernando (2020) explore the global macroeconomic effects of different scenarios
of how Covid-19 might evolve in the year ahead using a hybrid DSGE/CGE model. They
underscore the importance of spillover effects and show that even a contained outbreak could
significantly impact the global economy in the short run. Bonadio et al. (2020) study the im-
pact of Covid-19 on output growth in 64 countries and investigate the contribution of global
supply chains to these adverse effects. Ludvigson et al. (2020) quantify the macroeconomic
impact of Covid-19 in the United States using a VAR framework and a gauge of the mag-
nitude of the Covid-19 shock in relation to past costly disasters. Baqaee and Farhi (2020)
consider possible non-linearities in response to the Covid-19 shock in a multi-sectoral model.
They develop a disaggregated structural model with input-output linkages, as well as down-
ward nominal wage rigidities and a zero lower bound constraint on nominal policy rate to
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study the effects of supply and demand shocks associated with Covid-19. They demonstrate
how these shocks are amplified or mitigated by nonlinearities, and quantify their effects using
disaggregated data from the United States. Another paper which highlights the importance
of nonlinearity is Céspedes et al. (2020). They build a threshold macroeconomic model of a
pandemic and show how such a shock can have large magnification effects. Finally, Milani
(2020) uses a GVAR model to underscore the importance of countries’interconnections in
the evolution of Covid-19 and its unemployment effects.
Key challenges with the empirical economic analysis of Covid-19 include the following:
how to identify the shock, how to account for its non-linear effects, and how to quantify
its effects while accounting for spillovers, common global factors, network effects and un-
certainty. This paper contributes to the literature by addressing these issues in a coherent
multi-country framework. We offer an identification strategy for the Covid-19 shock consid-
ering that a synthetic control method cannot be applied in the context of a global pandemic.
Specifically, we use the GDP growth revisions of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in
April and June 2020 compared to their end-2019 forecasts to identify the Covid-19 shock.
We show that there exist threshold effects in the relationship between global financial mar-
ket volatility and output growth at individual country levels in a significant majority of
advanced economies and in the case of several emerging market countries. We develop a
threshold-augmented dynamic multi-country model (TGVAR) to estimate the global as well
as country-specific macroeconomic effects of the identified Covid-19 shock. We distinguish
common global factors from trade network effects and account for sample uncertainty based
on the constellation of disturbances that the global economy had experienced in the past
four decades as well as their spillovers and interactions. Finally, we show how the model can
be used for counterfactual analysis. This approach is very different from scenario analyses
or forecasts that are unconditional statements and need not be model based.
We employ Generalized Impulse Response Functions (GIRFs) to study the counterfactual
impact of the identified Covid-19 shock on the global economy as well as on the 33 individual
countries in our sample. In linear models, GIRFs possess the following key features: (i)
proportionality (namely, potential outcomes are linear in the size of the shock); (ii) state
independence (that is, the effects of the shocks do not vary in recessions or expansions);
and (iii) model invariance (namely, the underling model is invariant to the shock under
consideration). However, none of these features apply to non-linear dynamic models, which
as argued a priori and established empirically, are more likely to be relevant for the analysis
of large shocks, such as Covid-19. By using a threshold-augmented dynamic multi-country
model (TGVAR), we are able to allow for (i) non-proportional impacts of large and small
shocks; (ii) state-dependency; and (iii) more persistent outcomes. See Koop et al. (1996).
Standard GVAR modelling is designed to explicitly account for economic and financial
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interdependencies across markets and countries, and was originally proposed by Pesaran
et al. (2004) and further developed by Dees et al. (2007). It features elements of time
series, panel data, and factor analysis, and is particularly useful in studying the interna-
tional macroeconomic effects of various shocks. The standard GVAR model comprises 33
country/region-specific sub-models. These individual models are solved in a global setting
where core macroeconomic variables of each economy are related to corresponding foreign
variables (constructed exclusively to match the international trade pattern of the country
under consideration) as well as global variables. This framework is able to account for vari-
ous transmission channels, including trade relationships, as well as financial and commodity
price linkages. This is important at the current juncture, as many countries face a multi-
layered shock comprising a health emergency, domestic economic disruptions, plummeting
external demand, tighter financial conditions, and a collapse in commodity prices.
The GVAR model has been used in a range of studies, such as stress testing of banks by
the European Central Bank regulators, the analysis of China’s growing importance for the
global economy (Cesa-Bianchi et al. 2012 and Cashin et al. (2016, 2017b)), the international
macroeconomic transmission of weather shocks (Cashin et al. 2017a), the impact of com-
modity price shocks– see Mohaddes and Pesaran (2016, 2017) for the global macroeconomic
consequences of country-specific oil-supply shocks and Cashin et al. (2014) and Mohaddes
and Raissi (2019) for the differential effects of demand- and supply-driven commodity price
shocks– , and other real and financial shocks– see, for instance, Cesa-Bianchi et al. (2020)
and the GVAR handbook edited by di Mauro and Pesaran (2013) for empirical applications
from 27 contributors– , as well as in forecasting– see Pesaran et al. (2009) and Bussière
et al. (2012) for the earliest GVAR forecasting applications to the global economy. For an
extensive survey of the latest theoretical developments in GVARmodelling and the numerous
empirical analyses, see Chudik and Pesaran (2016) and Chapter 33 of Pesaran (2015).
Our counterfactual results show that the pandemic will likely reduce the world real GDP
by 3 percent below its model-generated path without the shock by the end of 2021. While
China and other emerging Asian economies are estimated to be less severely affected, the
United States, the United Kingdom, and several other advanced economies may experi-
ence deeper and longer-lasting effects. Among non-Asian emerging market economies, how-
ever, the economic impact of Covid-19 varies substantially, depending on domestic factors
(economic structures, health preparedness, and lockdowns) as well as external disturbances
(plunging trade, collapsing tourism, capital outflows, falling commodity prices). There is a
significant degree of uncertainty around all these counterfactual outcomes which we quantify
based on the approach above. Importantly, our findings underscore the role of spillovers
which we quantify for the case of Sweden considering its different approach toward the pan-
demic (i.e., a less stringent strategy). We show that no country is immune to the economic
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fallout of the pandemic because of interconnections. We also estimate that the Covid-19
pandemic will likely lower long-term interest rates by about 100 basis points below their
historical lows in core advanced economies. In contrast, the impact on long-term interest
rates in emerging market economies has a wide range, including significant upside risks.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 highlights the importance
of threshold effects in the growth—global volatility relationship. Section 3 develops the
threshold-augmented dynamic multi-country (TGVAR) model. Section 4 quantifies the
macroeconomic effects of Covid-19 under uncertainty using TGVAR. Finally, Section 5 offers
some concluding remarks. Additional results are provided in three appendices.
2 Threshold Effects: Global Volatility and Growth
Threshold effects have been used in the literature primarily in the context of autoregressions
pioneered by Tong (1990). These models are known as threshold autoregressions (TAR) and
allow the parameters of the autoregressive model to switch between two or more values. Ex-
tension of TAR models to multi-variate systems has been considered by Tsay (1998). Hansen
(2011) provides a recent review of TAR models, and discusses their empirical applications
in economics in areas such as growth dynamics, stock return volatility and forecasting.
Given the global nature of Covid-19, and to capture its non-linear economic effects, we
focus on a global measure of realized volatility, and consider its possible impact on country-





where w̃i is the PPP-GDP weight of country i, we index countries as i = 0, 1, ..., n, and rveit






where rit(τ) is the equity return during day τ in quarter t in country i, r̄it = D−1t
∑Dt
τ=1 rit(τ),
and Dt is the number of trading days in quarter t. The country-specific realized volatility
measures, rveit , have been used in the literature to investigate the effects of uncertainty on
growth. Here we focus on a global volatility measure, as opposed to country-specific ones,
to better capture the effects of global uncertainty, which is more akin to Covid-19.
One could use other measures of global volatility as well. For example, instead of aver-
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aging country-specific realized volatilities, we could first take the average of equity returns
across countries and then compute the realized volatility of global equity. Let rgt(τ) be the











A widely-used alternative measure of global volatility in the literature is the option-
implied volatility, or VIX. While the VIX captures the stock market’s expectation of volatility
based on S&P 500 index options and is only available from 1990, our preferred measure of
global volatility, grvet, is based on realized equity returns for a large number of countries and
is available for the last four decades. Note that the correlation of grvet and VIX is 89.8%,
therefore, grvet seems to follow the VIX index well but not too closely (see Figure 1), thus
capturing, to some degree, some of the volatilities that originate from emerging economies.
Appendix B systematically compares these three measures of global volatility and shows that
grvet is superior to other measures in terms of fit. Therefore, in what follows, we report the
results based on the grvet measure of global volatility.














Global volatility (grve) VIX (right scale)
Notes: The global realized volatility of equity returns, grvet, is aggregated using PPP-GDP weights. The
correlation between the two variables is 0.90.
We begin our econometric analysis with the following simple multi-country threshold-
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Table 1: Estimates of Threshold Coeffi cient ϕ, Threshold Parameter γ, and
AR(1) Coeffi cients in Threshold-augmented AR Specifications, 1979Q2—2019Q4
(a) Advanced economies: p̂=3.09% and γ̂=0.156
ϕ t-ratio ρ t-ratio R̄2 σ2
Australia -0.0059† -1.88 0.26‡ 3.48 7.8% 0.0069
Austria -0.0208‡ -5.10 -0.17† -2.28 13.5% 0.0087
Belgium -0.0079‡ -2.54 0.22‡ 2.86 9.6% 0.0066
Canada -0.0071‡ -2.50 0.48‡ 7.10 28.1% 0.0061
Finland -0.0203‡ -3.37 0.02 0.23 6.1% 0.0129
France -0.0064‡ -2.99 0.31‡ 4.01 17.5% 0.0045
Germany -0.0174‡ -4.35 -0.03 -0.37 10.0% 0.0084
Italy -0.0076‡ -2.51 0.31‡ 4.16 16.8% 0.0063
Japan -0.0083† -1.86 0.21† 2.55 6.8% 0.0095
Korea -0.0030 -0.40 0.02 0.22 -1.1% 0.0163
Netherlands -0.0128‡ -3.99 0.17† 2.23 13.6% 0.0069
Norway -0.0133‡ -2.44 -0.29‡ -4.00 10.4% 0.0120
New Zealand -0.0029 -0.74 0.20‡ 2.60 3.4% 0.0086
Singapore -0.0107∗ -1.32 0.23‡ 2.98 6.5% 0.0174
Spain -0.0035† -2.14 0.76‡ 14.99 62.4% 0.0034
Sweden -0.0247‡ -4.64 -0.35‡ -4.62 16.3% 0.0112
Switzerland -0.0095‡ -2.74 0.17† 2.18 8.3% 0.0073
United Kingdom -0.0047∗ -1.51 0.30‡ 4.07 12.4% 0.0066
United States -0.0096‡ -3.29 0.33‡ 4.55 19.9% 0.0062
MG (equally weighted) -0.0103‡ -6.60 0.17‡ 2.76
MG (PPP-GDP weighted) -0.0092‡ -6.27 0.26‡ 4.47
(b) Emerging economies: p̂=4.94% and γ̂=0.129
ϕ t-ratio ρ t-ratio R̄2 σ2
Argentina -0.0061 -0.93 0.53‡ 7.78 27.2% 0.0180
Brazil -0.0082∗ -1.36 0.22‡ 2.93 5.5% 0.0166
Chile -0.0065 -0.95 0.26‡ 3.25 6.0% 0.0187
China 0.0035 0.88 0.32‡ 4.17 9.0% 0.0110
India -0.0071 -1.12 -0.24‡ -3.04 4.5% 0.0171
Indonesia -0.0093∗ -1.32 0.01 0.12 -0.1% 0.0195
Malaysia -0.0074∗ -1.44 0.31‡ 4.03 11.7% 0.0137
Mexico -0.0156‡ -3.09 0.14∗ 1.85 7.9% 0.0137
Peru -0.0189† -2.01 0.37‡ 5.04 14.5% 0.0258
Philippines 0.0034 0.64 0.16† 2.03 1.3% 0.0143
South Africa -0.0018 -0.71 0.54‡ 8.09 29.1% 0.0068
Saudi Arabia 0.0075 1.32 0.61‡ 9.94 38.2% 0.0157
Thailand -0.0263‡ -3.60 0.01 0.13 6.6% 0.0199
Turkey -0.0294‡ -3.27 -0.02 -0.27 5.2% 0.0247
MG (equally weighted) -0.0087‡ -2.99 0.23‡ 3.53
MG (PPP-GDP weighted) -0.0038 -1.02 0.18 1.58
Notes: Our threshold-augmented dynamic output growth model is given by∆yit = ci+ρi∆yit−1+ϕizt−1(γ)+
eit, where ∆yit is the first difference of the logarithm of real GDP in country i during quarter t and zt =
I(grvet > γ). I (A) is an indicator variable that takes the value of unity if event A occurs and zero otherwise.
grvet is a measure of global volatility defined by (1), and γ is the threshold parameter. The estimation sample
is 1979Q2 to 2019Q4. Statistical significance is denoted by ∗, † and ‡, at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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augmented dynamic output growth model:
∆yit = ci + ρi∆yit−1 + ϕizt−1(γ) + eit, (4)
for i = 0, 1, 2, ..., n, and t = 1, 2, ..., T,
where ∆yit = yit − yi,t−1, is the first difference of the logarithm of real GDP for country i
during quarter t, and zt = I(grvet > γ) is the global volatility threshold variable, I (A) is an
indicator variable that takes the value of unity if event A occurs and zero otherwise, grvet
is the global realized volatility defined by (1), and γ is a threshold parameter, assumed to
be the same across countries under consideration. eit is the idiosyncratic error assumed to
be serially uncorrelated with a zero mean.
The above specification only allows for intercept shifts in output growth equations, thus
treating the threshold variable, zt−1(γ), as another common factor, with the threshold pa-
rameter estimated by pooling across countries. Modelling other forms of threshold effects,
including country-specific thresholds, will unduly complicate the modelling exercise and is
beyond the scope of the present paper. We model the threshold effects with respect to
lagged values of the realized volatility variable, and rely on standard common factor analysis
to capture possible simultaneity between output growths and volatility. See Section 3.
The results of estimating equation (4) for advanced and emerging economies are sum-
marized in Table 1. In addition to reporting the estimates of γ and ϕi, we also report
the estimate of the proportion of times that the threshold is exceeded, denoted by p. The
threshold parameter, γ, is estimated by grid search and is allowed to take different values
for advanced and emerging economies. The estimate of γ for advanced economies at 0.156
is slightly larger than the value of 0.129 estimated for emerging economies. Given these
estimates, the global volatility threshold variable is statistically significant in 15 out of the
19 (80%) advanced economies in our sample. But the results are much weaker for emerging
economies, with only 4 statistically significant effects out of the 14 emerging economies in our
sample. Nevertheless, all statistically significant threshold affects were negative, suggesting
that excessive global volatility is generally associated with lower output growth subsequently.
There are a numbers of channels through which excessive global financial market volatility
can adversely affect economic growth. They include higher precautionary savings by house-
holds, lower or delayed investment by firms due to increased uncertainty and weaker demand
prospects, and a higher cost of raising capital owing to higher funding costs in a volatile envi-
ronment. See, for example, Cesa-Bianchi et al. (2020) and the references therein. In normal
conditions where global volatility is low (below the threshold γ), financial markets are able
to price the volatility risk, and therefore weaken the relationship between output growth and
the volatility factor. But during periods of heightened volatility, that occur very rarely, it is
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diffi cult to price the volatility risk properly and it is thus more likely for excess volatility to
show up as statistically significant in output growth equations.
Overall, while we manage to detect threshold effects in the output growth—global volatility
relationship in many advanced economies (80 percent of cases), similar results for emerging
markets are less pervasive (with threshold effects being statistically significant in 30 percent of
cases) for the following reason. Compared to advanced countries, exposure to global equity
markets is lower in emerging market economies (that is, they have less developed capital
markets and rely more on the banking sector for credit intermediation). Nonetheless, in these
countries output growth could well be non-linearly affected by localized events (e.g., natural
disasters; banking, currency and sovereign crises) or external shocks (e.g., commodity price
volatility and capital flow reversals), and be exacerbated by country-specific characteristics
(internal and external imbalances). However, these types of threshold effects will not be
captured by our econometric specification that focuses on the global realized volatility of
equity returns that is more reflective of developments in advanced economies.1



























Global GDP growth (right scale)
Notes: Global realized volatility of equity returns, grvet, and global GDP growth are both aggregated using
PPP-GDP weights.
The above findings underscore the importance of allowing for threshold effects in studying
the macroeconomic consequences of Covid-19– which, considering its unprecedented nature,
generated a sharp tightening in global financial conditions (Figure 1). Specifically, global
equity markets sold off sharply through mid-March as the pandemic spread across the world.
From end-2019 to trough, the S&P 500 index in the United States fell 30 percent. Stock
prices in other major economies experienced declines of similar magnitude and flight to
1As a robustness check, we are able to detect the presence of threshold effects in a larger number of
economies if we start the sample from 1990Q1. See Appendix B for the estimation results and other details.
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safety resulted in sharp capital outflows from emerging market economies. Notwithstanding
the improvement in global risk sentiment since March amid large-scale liquidity injections
by major central banks and a gradual relaxation of lockdowns in many countries, output
recovery is expected to be gradual with GDP growth in many economies expected to be
negatively affected by the previous bout of financial market volatility (Figure 2).
3 A Threshold Augmented GVAR (TGVAR) Model
with Global Latent Factors
In what follows, we study the implications of Covid-19 for the global economy. In doing so
we build on the GVAR literature and develop a threshold-augmented dynamic multi-country
framework, which we refer to as Threshold-augmented GVAR, or TGVAR for short. The
proposed modelling framework takes into account both the temporal and cross-sectional
dimensions of the data; real and financial drivers of economic activity; interlinkages and
spillovers that exist between different regions/countries; and the global common factors, as
well as network effects (e.g., through trade linkages). This is crucial as the impact of shocks
(and importantly that of Covid-19) cannot be reduced to a single country but rather involves
multiple regions/countries, and this impact may be amplified or dampened depending on the
degree of openness of the countries (both trade and financial) and their economic structures.
Informed by the results in Section 2, we also allow for threshold effects in the output growth
equation arising from global financial market volatility. Moreover, in contrast to the standard
GVAR models that rely on trade-weighted averages to capture both local and global effects,
we treat these effects separately. Before describing our model specification, we provide a
short exposition of the methodology and data.
3.1 Data and Variables
We consider a world economy composed of n + 1 interconnected countries. Our focus is
to model output growth and its responses to common shocks, either directly or indirectly
through equity and bond markets. Specifically, for each economy i, we include the logarithm
of real GDP (gdpit), nominal long-term interest rate (lrit), the logarithm of real equity prices
(eqit), and the logarithm of the real exchange rate (the nominal exchange rate deflated by the
consumer price index), epit. Data on these variables are obtained from the updated GVAR
data set which includes 33 countries and covers the period 1979Q2 to 2019Q4. For a detailed
description of data sources and related transformations see Mohaddes and Raissi (2020).
To avoid highly persistent variables we work with first-differences and denote the endoge-
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nous country-specific variables by
yit = (∆gdpit,∆lrit,∆eqit,∆epit)
′ . (5)
The U.S. economy is denoted by i = 0, with the remaining economies indexed by i =
1, 2, ..., n, in no particular order. For estimation we suppose that yit is available over the
period t = 1, 2, ..., T , although the bond and equity variables, ∆lrit and ∆eqit, are not
available for some of the countries in our dataset. Therefore, the dimension of yit, which
we denote by ki, differs across countries. Let k =
∑n
i=0 ki, and collect all country-specific
variables in a single k × 1 vector yt = (y′0t,y′1t,y′2t, ...,y′nt)
′.
Given the focus of our analysis, we augment the standard GVAR model with observed
and unobserved external common factors. We consider changes in log oil prices, ∆poilt, and
global volatility, grvet, as common observed factors and include them in the 2× 1 vector
gt = (∆poilt, grvet)
′ . (6)
In addition, we use the weighted cross-sectional averages of the following four variables to








i=0 w̃igdpit, w̃i is the PPP-GDP weight of country i, and similarly l̃rt =∑n
i=0 w̃ilrit, ẽqt =
∑n
i=0 w̃ieqit, and ẽpt =
∑n
i=0 w̃iepit. One could also apply the principal
component analysis (PCA) to yt, but that would involve estimating the number of common
factors and deciding whether the PCA is applied to different components of yit separately or
to all of its four components together. The weighted cross section averages,∆g̃dpt,∆l̃rt,∆ẽqt,
and ∆ẽpt , are likely to be closely correlated with the first principal component of ∆gdpit,
∆lrit,∆eqit,and ∆epit, for i = 0, 1, ..., n, respectively.
To link the global aggregates to the country-specific variables, we introduce a k × k
weights matrix, W̃, and define it such that
ỹt = W̃yt. (8)
In addition to global aggregates, we also allow for transmission of shocks through the trade














j=1wijgdpit, {wij} are the trade weights, j = 0, 1, ...n, wii = 0, and∑n
j=0 wij = 1. For empirical application, the trade weights are computed as three-year
averages:
wij =
Tij,2014 + Tij,2015 + Tij,2016
Ti,2014 + Ti,2015 + Ti,2016
, (10)
where Tijt is the bilateral trade of country i with country j during a given year t and is
calculated as the average of exports and imports of country i with j, and Tit =
∑n
j=0 Tijt
(the total trade of country i) for t = 2014, 2015 and 2016, in the case of all countries. A




it. As it is well
known in the GVAR literature, the country-specific aggregates y∗it relate to yt through the
following links
y∗it = Wiyt, for i = 0, 1, ..., n,
where Wi is the ki × k matrix of trade weights for country i.
The main difference between the two sets of aggregates, ỹt and y∗it, for i = 0, 1, ..., n, is
the weights used in their construction. These two variables are likely to be highly correlated
contemporaneously. The reason for considering both aggregates (cross-section averages) is
to distinguish the effects of global factors from local (trade related) effects, captured by
country-specific trade linkages. Also to avoid multi-collinearity and related identification
problems, we include only lagged country-specific cross-section averages, y∗i,t−1, and rely on
global cross-section averages, ỹt, to capture contemporaneous effects of global factors.
3.2 Global and Individual Country Specifications
We specify the following equations for gt and ỹt
gt = cg + Θggt−1 + Θgyỹt−1 + vgt, (11)
and
ỹt = cỹ + Θyggt−1 + Θyỹt−1 + vỹt. (12)
Let ft = (g′t, ỹ
′
t)
′, and write (11)—(12) as





















We consider the following country-specific threshold-augmented models:
yit = cy,i + Φiyi,t−1 + Biy
∗
i,t−1 + A0,ift + A1,ift−1 + λizt−1 (γi) + uit, (14)
for i = 0, 1, ..., n, where the threshold indicator, zt−1 (γi), is defined by
zt−1 (γi) = I [(0, 1)
′gt−1 > γi] = I (grvet−1 > γi) . (15)
We allow the country-specific error vectors, uit, to be cross-sectionally weakly correlated, and
do not attempt to parametrize this correlation. Therefore, contemporaneous values of y∗it
are not included in (14). Including non-granular (local) cross-section average of dependent
variables– also known as spatial lags– on the right side of (14) is common in the spatial
literature, where the contemporaneous correlation (after controlling for lags and common
factors) is fully parametrized by introducing contemporaneous spatial lags, which, if spec-
ified correctly, would then identify geographical origins of the shocks. It is important to
highlight that including non-granular contemporaneous cross-section averages of the depen-
dent variable in (14), would result in inconsistent least squares estimation, due to correlation
between uit and the non-granular cross-sectional averages (spatial lags) even when n is large,
and a full maximum likelihood or GMM type estimation will be required.
Equations (11) and (12) are specifications for global variables and global aggregates.
Equation (14), for i = 0, 1, ..., n, relates to country specific models. Equation (15) links the
threshold indicator with the vector of global variables. Moreover, we have two additional
linking equations. Equation (8) links global aggregates ỹt with yt, and
y∗t = Wyt, (16)











the full k × 1 vector of endogenous variables, yt, and W = (W′0,W′1, ...,W′n)
′ is the k∗ × k
matrix of pre-determined weights.
3.3 The TGVAR Representation
Substituting (13) for ft in (14), we obtain
yit = di + Φiyi,t−1 + By,iy
∗
i,t−1 + Bf,ift−1 + λy,izt−1 (γi) + A0,ivt + uit, (17)
where Bf,i = A1,i + A0,iΘ, and di = cy,i + A0,icf . Note that the substitution of the
global model (13) for ft in the country-specific models (14) avoids the possibility of the
rank-deficiency problem discussed in Section 4.1 of Chudik et al. (2016). In addition,
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it allows for an error structure that explicitly features common and idiosyncratic shocks.
Our approach differs from the earlier GVAR models in the literature that only rely on the
conditional country-specific equations in (14) and the marginal equation for the observed
common variables gt in (11). In contrast, (17) utilizes the equation (12) for ỹt as well. This
approach is also adopted by Cesa-Bianchi et al. (2020) and Chudik et al. (2020).
Stacking (17) for i = 0, 1, 2, ..., n, we obtain
yt = d + Φyt−1 + Byy
∗
t−1 + Bf ft−1 + Λyzt−1 (γ) + A0vt + ut, (18)


































zt−1 (γ) = [zt−1 (γ1) , zt−1 (γ2) , ..., zt−1 (γn)]










Substituting identity (16) for y∗t−1 in (18), we have
yt = d + (Φ + ByW) yt−1 + Bf ft−1 + Λyzt−1 (γ) + A0vt + ut,
Partitioning






and substituting (8) for ỹt, we obtain
yt = cy +
(
Φ + ByW + BỹW̃
)
yt−1 + Bggt−1 + Λyzt−1 (γ) + Avvt + ut, (19)
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Substituting identity (8) for ỹt−1 in equations for gt in (11), we have
gt = cg + Θggt−1 + ΘgyW̃yt−1 + vgt, (20)
Stacking (19) and (20), we obtain the following TGVAR representation for the full set of
observables, the (k + 2)× 1 vector xt = (y′t,g′t)
′,






































et is a vector of reduced form shocks, composed of global (vt) and idiosyncratic shocks (εt).
Given our focus on the output effects of the Covid-19 shock, and to keep the analyses
empirically manageable, we consider the effects of the threshold variable on the output
growth variables only, and accordingly set λy,i = (λ∆gdp,i, 0, 0, 0)′. Without loss of generality,
we identify advanced economies by i = 0, 1, ..., na and the emerging market countries by
i = na + 1, na + 2, ..., n. Moreover, currently available time series observations do not allow
for the estimation of country-specific threshold effects which capture rare events. Thus, we




γadv for i = 0, 1, ..., na
γeme for i = na + 1, na + 2, ..., n
. (25)
Thresholds γadv and γeme are estimated by a grid-search method outlined in Appendix A.
We excluded the threshold indicator from a few countries, where λ̂∆gdp,i > 0.
Finally, given the dominant role played by U.S. in the global financial markets, we exclude
∆l̃rt,∆ẽqt, and ∆ẽpt from the U.S. model by restricting the corresponding rows of the
coeffi cient matrices A0,0 and Bf,0 to zero vectors.
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3.4 Identification of the Covid-19 Shock
Identifying the economic effects of Covid-19 is not a straightforward task as our historical
sample is not informative about such a shock. Also considering the truly global nature of
the pandemic, it is not possible to compare economic outcomes from countries affected by
Covid-19 with a control group that has not been buffeted by the Covid-19 shock. At best,
we could compare economic outcomes across countries that followed different strategies to
mitigate the spread of the pandemic. This approach is also limited as most countries have
followed very similar approaches (for example, lockdowns) with just a few exceptions (such
as Sweden which we consider below), and they differ mainly in terms of the timing of the
implemented social distancing policies (for example, Germany and the United Kingdom).
Here we adopt a historical country-specific approach and identify the Covid-19 shock by
comparing the IMF’s GDP forecasts for Q1 to Q4 of 2020 formed at the end of 2019– before
the spread of the pandemic and when no one (including the IMF) could have predicted the
global economic disruption that was brought about by the pandemic– to the same forecasts
prepared in April 2020. We attribute the IMF’s GDP forecast revisions in 2020Q1 to the
Covid-19 shock. In effect, we assume that the short-term IMF forecasts at the end of 2019
were free from systemic bias and can be used as potential outcomes in the absence of the
Covid-19 shock. We believe this is a reasonable identifying assumption, in view of the
unprecedented nature of the Covid-19 pandemic. Accordingly, we assume that up to 2019Q4
(t = 1, 2, ..., T ), et is given by (23), but for Q1 to Q4 of 2020, it is given by
eT+q = ωT+q + ΓvT+q + εT+q, for q = 1, 2, 3, 4, (26)
where ωT+q corresponds to the Covid-19 shock in the period T + q. We assume ωt = 0 for
t ≤ T , but it is nonzero for t = T + 1, T + 2, T + 3, T + 4. To identify ωT+q we will use the
size of IMF’s forecast revisions at the end 2020Q1.
Let ∆gdpAprili,T+q be the April 2020 IMF World Economic Outlook (WEO) GDP growth
forecasts for country i in quarters q = 1, 2, 3, 4 of 2020, and ∆gdpJani,T+q be the associated
January 2020 IMF WEO forecasts. We compute the April-January forecast revisions as
κi,q = ∆gdp
April
i,T+q −∆gdpJani,T+q, for q = 1, 2, 3, 4,
and i = 0, 1, 2, ..., n. Assuming that developments surrounding Covid-19 were the only
dominant developments behind the forecast revisions, we use κq = (κ1,q, κ2,q, ..., κn,q)
′, for
q = 1, 2, 3, 4 to infer ωT+q.
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3.4.1 Using IMF Forecasts to Infer ωT+q
Let us define S as the matrix that selects all output growth variables from the vector xt,
namely
Sxt = ∆gdpt = (∆gdp0t,∆gdp1t, ....,∆gdpnt)
′.
We set individual elements of ωT+1 that correspond to GDP to be given by the corresponding
κi,1, and use the historical correlations of the reduced form errors to estimate the remaining
elements. This yields
ω̂T+1 = D̂eκ1, (27)




, in which Σ̂e is the estimate ofΣe = ΓΣvΓ′+Σε,Σv = E (vtv′t)




















We define the Covid-19 effects by the difference
ηc (T, h) = xcT+h − x0T+h, (29)
where xcT+h is a counterfactual realization of the global economy after the Covid-19 shock
hit the economy, namely {ωT+j = ω̂T+j}4j=1, and x0T+h = E (xT+h| IT ) is the conditional
expectation of global economy without the Covid-19 shock, conditioning on the informa-
tion IT = {xT ,xT−1, ...}. The distribution of ηc (T, h) can be computed by stochastically
simulating xcT+h and x
0
T+h as described in Sections A.3 and A.4 of Appendix A.
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4 The Effects of Covid-19 on Economic Activity and
Long-term Interest Rates
Our model includes 33 economies, which together cover more than 90% of world GDP, see
Table 2. For presentation of our results, we create a euro area block comprising 8 of the 11
countries that initially joined the Euro in 1999: Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany,
Italy, Netherlands, and Spain. The time series data for the euro area are constructed as cross-
sectionally weighted averages of the domestic variables, using Purchasing Power Parity GDP
weights, averaged over the 2014 to 2016 period. In addition to the euro area we also consider
a further seven regions, see Table 2.
Table 2: Countries and Regions in the TGVAR Model
Advanced Economies Euro Area Emerging Economies Emerging Asia
Australia Austria (excl. China) (excl. China)
Austria Belgium Argentina India
Belgium Finland Brazil Indonesia
Canada France Chile Malaysia
Finland Germany India Philippines
France Italy Indonesia Thailand
Germany Netherlands Malaysia
Japan Spain Mexico Latin America
Korea Peru Argentina
Netherlands Advanced Asia Pacific Philippines Brazil
Norway Australia South Africa Chile
New Zealand Japan Saudi Arabia Mexico
Singapore Korea Thailand Peru
Spain New Zealand Turkey
Sweden Singapore Other Emerging
Switzerland Economies
United Kingdom Other Advanced China Turkey






4.1 Real GDP Effects are Large and Persistent
Figure 3 reports the results of our counterfactual exercise for real GDP between 2020Q1 and
2021Q4.2 The solid lines are the generalized impulse responses of real GDP following the
2The codes for the TGVAR model will be made available here.
17
Figure 3: The Impact of Covid-19 on Real GDP (percent deviation from baseline)
World Advanced Economies Emerging Economies excl. China
China Euro Area United Kingdom
United States Advanced Asia Pacific Other Advanced Economies
Emerging Asia excl. China Latin America Other Emerging Economies
Notes: The impact is in percent and the horizon is quarterly. This figure plots quantiles of ηc (T, h) defined
by (29).
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Covid-19 shock, while the bounds represent the range of likely outcomes given the constella-
tion of shocks experienced over the past four decades. Uncertainty around these forecasts are
pervasive because of the severity and duration of the Covid-19 pandemic, global spillovers,
financial market volatility, the effi cacy of policy actions to protect firms and households,
and the success of pharmaceutical interventions to contain the spread of the coronavirus.
Overall, the Covid-19 pandemic would leave the 2021 GDP about 3 percentage points lower
than the model-generated forecast of global GDP in the absence of Covid-19. The adverse
impact on Advanced Economies is particularly large– ranging from 2 percentage points be-
low pre-crisis path of GDP by the end of 2021 in the euro area to 6.5 percentage points in
the United States.
Among emerging markets, however, the economic impact of the Covid-19 shock varies
substantially. In addition to domestic shocks (health crisis and lockdowns), these countries
have been facing a range of external shocks as well (plunging trade, collapsing tourism,
capital outflows, falling commodity prices), albeit to varying degrees, and have different
economic structures (those relying heavily on certain sectors are naturally more vulnerable
to the adverse macroeconomic effects of the pandemic). China appears to be an exception
largely because most of the country had reopened by early April and its lower size of inward
spillovers. Emerging Asia excluding China is expected to be less affected by Covid-19 than
Latin America. This is partly due to higher commodity dependence of the latter and tighter
financing conditions, as well as being less successful is containing the pandemic.
Figure 4 reports the results of our counterfactual exercise for real GDP of Sweden under
two scenarios: (i) growth shock in all 33 countries in our sample arising from the Covid-19
pandemic and (ii) growth shock in all countries except for Sweden. Comparing the two sets
of results highlights the importance of spillovers through disruptions in global supply chains,
travel, and tourism. The results in Figure 4 illustrate that no country can shield itself from
the adverse economic effects of Covid-19 by following less stringent lockdowns.
Figures 5 and 6 report the results of our counterfactual exercise for the evolution of
real GDP following the Covid-19 shock relative to the 2019Q4 output levels rather than
the model-generated forecasts of real GDP in the absence of Covid-19. In other words, we
assess how long it will take for different countries/regions to return to their 2019Q4 real
GDP levels following the Covid-19 shock. Informed by IMF growth projections in April,
global activity is expected to trough in the second quarter of 2020, recovering thereafter.
The expected recovery in global activity is mainly driven by Asian economies (most notably
China) while the United States and the United Kingdom are less likely to recuperate income
losses by the end of 2021 (that is, their GDP is projected to end 2021 below 2019Q4 levels by
about 2 and 1.5 percent with high probability, respectively). Consistent with the results in
Figure 3, China’s real GDP is expected to recover rapidly the lost ground, while non-Asian
19
Figure 4: Spillovers to Sweden (percent deviation from baseline)
Growth shocks in all countries incl. Sweden Growth shocks in all countries excl. Sweden
Notes: The impact is in percent and the horizon (h) is quarterly.
Figure 5: Dynamics of Real GDP Following the Covid-19 Shock (in logs;
2019Q4=1)
China Euro Area
United States United Kingdom
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Figure 6: Dynamics of Regions’Real GDP Following the Covid-19 Shock (in
logs; 2019Q4=1)
World Advanced Economies
Advanced Asia Pacific Other Advanced Economies
Emerging Economies excl. China Emerging Asia excl. China
Latin America Other Emerging Economies
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emerging economies are likely to take longer to achieve a full recovery. In all cases, there is
a significant amount of uncertainly around the counterfactual GDP paths. See also Table
3 for likely growth outcomes. Note that these growth outcomes will be significantly worse
if one were to use the updated forecast revisions of the IMF in June 2020 to gauge the size
of the shock rather than the April vintage (see Appendix C for details). This is because in
June, the IMF updated its GDP forecasts based on more information about the pathway
of the pandemic and the intensity and effi cacy of containment efforts. The IMF, therefore,
downgraded its projections of growth in the first half of 2020 and portrayed a more gradual
recovery thereafter than previously forecast.
Table 3: Growth Outcomes Following the Covid-19 Shock (percent change)
Q4 over Q4
2019 2020 2021
Median 10th pctl Median 90th pctl 10th pctl Median 90th pctl
Advanced Economies 1.4 -6.8 -3.7 -0.9 1.7 3.9 6.3
United States 2.4 -9.7 -5.1 -0.8 -0.1 3.2 6.4
Euro Area 0.8 -6.4 -3.0 0.6 2.5 5.0 7.6
France 1.0 -4.9 -1.4 2.3 1.2 3.5 5.8
Germany 0.4 -8.6 -3.4 2.3 1.0 3.6 5.8
Italy 0.1 -9.7 -5.3 -1.0 0.8 3.9 7.1
Japan -0.5 -8.6 -3.2 2.9 0.0 3.4 6.4
United Kingdom 1.3 -9.1 -4.7 -0.7 1.3 3.3 5.7
Canada 1.5 -8.5 -4.1 0.5 -0.4 4.3 8.6
Emerging Markets (excl. China) 3.0 -4.7 0.8 6.4 2.3 4.9 7.4
Emerging Asia (excl. China) 4.6 -2.5 4.3 11.5 4.6 5.9 7.2
Latin America 0.5 -8.8 -2.3 4.6 -1.6 4.1 8.7
China 6.1 4.3 10.0 15.7 4.8 7.9 10.3
4.2 Long-term Interest Rates Face Downward Pressures
Global public debt is expected to reach its highest recorded level (above 100 percent of
global GDP and higher than the post-World War II peaks) partly driven by the massive fiscal
response to the Covid-19 pandemic and its economic fallout (13 percent of GDP globally). At
the same time, the 10-year government bond yields are at their historical lows and negative
in several advanced economies (Figure 7). To the extent that borrowing costs are projected
to stay at low levels, they make it easier to service public debt. Figure 8 reports the results
of our counterfactual exercise for long-term interest rates between 2020Q1 and 2021Q4. For
advanced economies (especially those that are perceived to be safe havens), long-term interest
rates are expected to fall even below their pre-Covid levels as the crisis raises precautionary
savings and dampens investment demand. However, the same cannot be said about emerging
market economies where borrowing rates can increase rapidly as shown by the upper range
of our counterfactual exercise in Figure 8. Among safe havens, Japan appears to be an
exception partly driven by Bank of Japan’s policy of yield-curve control.
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Figure 7: Public Debt andMarket Interest Rates (in percent of GDP and percent
respectively)
Gross Public Debt 10-Year Government Bond Yields
Sources: Gaspar and Gopinath (2020), Jordà et al. (2019), and IMF staff calculations.
Note: The sample for the interest rates includes Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United King-
dom, and US. The figure shows the interquartile range (yellow bars) and the 10th and 90th percentiles
(whiskers). Red markers signify the United States. Data for 2020 are through the end of March.
Figure 8: The Impact of Covid-19 on Long-term Interest Rates (percentage
points deviation from baseline)
Advanced Economies Emerging Economies excl. China United States
Euro Area Japan United Kingdom
Notes: The impact is in percentage points and the horizon (h) is quarterly.
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These predictions are largely borne out by actual data. For example, in the first half
of 2020, 10-year government bond yields in the United States, the United Kingdom, and
Germany fell by 111, 44, and 10 basis points, respectively, and that of Japan increased by 10
basis points– all within our counterfactual ranges displayed in Figure 8. Among emerging
markets, South Africa experienced a 137 basis points increase in its 10-year government bond
yields during the first half of 2020– again within our prediction ranges.
5 Concluding Remarks
The Covid-19 pandemic has been a shock like no other, initiating simultaneous demand and
supply disruptions. In addition, it led to a sharp tightening in global financial market con-
ditions during the first quarter of 2020. Using quarterly data over the past four decades,
we first showed that global financial market volatility (beyond certain thresholds) can ad-
versely affect economic growth in a significant majority (80 percent) of advanced countries
and for several emerging market economies. We then developed a threshold-augmented dy-
namic multi-country model, or TGVAR for short, to study the global macroeconomic effects
of Covid-19. We identified the country-specific Covid-19 shocks by comparing IMF’s GDP
forecasts for Q1 to Q4 of 2020 formed at the end of 2019 (before the spread of the pandemic)
to the same forecasts prepared in April 2020. Finally, using the TGVAR model we quantified
the range of likely macroeconomic outcomes following the Covid-19 shock.
Our results showed that the Covid-19 pandemic can lead to long-lasting declines in world
real GDP with varied effects across regions/countries. The impact of Covid-19 on the US,
UK, and several other advanced economies could be particularly severe, while China and
other emerging Asian economies are estimated to fare better. We also estimated that the
Covid-19 pandemic can lower long-term interest rates below their recent lows in core ad-
vanced economies, but the reverse outcome is predicted for emerging markets, with implica-
tions for debt servicing costs in these economies. Our findings highlighted the importance of
policy interventions to restore the normal functioning of financial markets, as well as adopt-
ing other measures (fiscal and liquidity) that can limit bankruptcies of viable firms and
support incomes of households. These measures would likely limit the amount of scarring.
Note that the pandemic could resurface in waves– that is, with every easing of social dis-
tancing restrictions, the infection rates could rise again, which would require re-imposition
of those restrictions, as we have seen in Europe and parts of the United States lately–
dampening economic activity and confidence. Appendix C shows how more up-to-date infor-
mation about the pathway of the pandemic (considering its rarity) can affect our predictions.
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A Estimation and Simulation of TGVAR
This appendix provides technical details on the estimation and simulation of the threshold-augmented
GVAR (TGVAR) model. Section A.1 describes how we estimate the model, while Section A.2 ex-
plains the bootstrapping procedure we use to capture the uncertainty of the parameter estimates.
Sections A.3 and A.4 outline how we simulate x0T+h and x
c
T+h, respectively.
A.1 Estimation of TGVAR Models
Let πmin = 1% and πmax = 20%.3 We set Sπ,T = {j/T ;πmin < j/T < πmax}, and our grid set for
γ is given by
Sγ = {qgrve (1− π) ;π ∈ Sπ,T } , (A.1)
where qgrve (α) is α quantile of {grve1, grve2, ..., grveT }, and grvet is the global volatility measure
for quarter t, defined by (1).




ft = cf + Θf t−1 + vt, (A.2)
is estimated by least squares. For a given γs ∈ Sγ , we set γi = γs for all i belonging either to
advanced and emerging economies, and estimate
yit = di + Φiyi,t−1 + By,iy
∗
i,t−1 + Bf,ift−1 + λy,izt−1 (γs) + A0,ivt + uit, (A.3)





xt = c + Gxt−1 + Λzt−1 (γs) + et, with et = Γvt + εt, (A.4)
as described in the main text, where γs = γsτn+1, and τn+1 is (n+ 1) × 1 vector of ones. Let
êt = êt (γs) denote the estimated residuals in (A.4). We compute















where Iadv is the index set of advanced economies, and Ieme is the index set of emerging economies.
Given the estimates γ̂adv and γ̂eme, we set γ̂i = γ̂adv if economy i belongs to the group of
advanced economies and γ̂i = γ̂eme if economy i belongs to the group of emerging economies. Then
3The choice of πmin = 1% implies that at least two time periods have nonzero threshold values, using the
full sample 1979Q2 to 2019Q4 as well as the 1990Q1—2019Q4 subsample. We use πmin = 1% in the simple
multi-country threshold augmented dynamic model specifications, given by (4). In the full-scale TGVAR
specifications (14), where many more country-specific coeffi cients are estimated, we set πmin = 2%.
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(A.3) is re-estimated using γ̂adv or γ̂eme (depending on the country grouping). We have excluded
the threshold variable from countries where λ̂∆gdp,i > 0. The corresponding GVAR model is then
estimated and solved based on (A.2)—(A.3). In particular, using hats to denote the corresponding
estimates, we have
xt = ĉ + Ĝxt−1 + Λ̂zt−1 (γ̂) + êt, êt = Γ̂v̂t + ε̂t.
A.2 Bootstrapping the TGVAR Model
This section describes how we generate bootstrap replications of ĉ, Ĝ, Λ̂, Γ̂, v̂t and ε̂t, denoted as
ĉ(r), Ĝ(r), Λ̂(r), Γ̂(r), v̂(r)t and ε̂
(r)
t , for the r
th replication.
1. We generate v̂(r)t , and ε̂
(r)
t , for t = 2, 3, ..., T , as a random shuffl e of {v̂t, t = 2, 3, ..., T} and
{ε̂t, t = 2, 3, ..., T}, respectively.
2. We set x(r)1 = x1 and z
(r)
1 (γ̂) = z1 (γ̂), and for t = 2, 3, 4, ..., T , we compute
x
(r)

















, for i = 0, 1, 2, ..., n, (A.8)
recalling that γ̂i = γ̂adv if economy i belongs to the group of advanced economies, and





t (γ̂i) > 1 for all i (advanced and emerging). If not, repeat steps 1—3 until
this condition is satisfied.






and the threshold values (γ̂adv, γ̂eme), we estimate (A.2)—(A.3)

















































A.3 Simulation of x0T+h
Bootstrap replications for x0T+h (conditional prediction of the model in the absence of Covid-19
shock) are generated recursively for h = 1, 2, ...hmax. Let r = 1, 2, ..., R.
1. We generate v̂(r)T+h, and ε̂
(r)
T+h, for h = 1, 2, ..., hmax, as a random shuffl e of {v̂t, t = 2, 3, ..., T}
and {ε̂t, t = 2, 3, ..., T}, respectively.
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(r) + Ĝ(r)xT + Λ̂














, for i = 0, 1, 2, ..., n, (A.11)
where ĉ(r), Ĝ(r), Λ̂(r), Γ̂(r) are the bootstrap replication r of ĉ, Ĝ, Λ̂, Γ̂ computed as described
in Section A.2.























, for i = 0, 1, 2, ..., n, (A.13)









T+h, r = 1, 2, ..., R
}
.
A.4 Simulation of xcT+h










































































where Ĝ(r) and Σ̂(r)e are the bootstrap replications of Ĝ and Σ̂e described in Section A.2.
Bootstrap replications for xcT+h are generated recursively for h = 1, 2, ...hmax.
1. We generate v̂(r)T+h, and ε̂
(r)
T+h, for h = 1, 2, ..., hmax, as a random shuffl e of {v̂t, t = 2, 3, ..., T}
and {ε̂t, t = 2, 3, ..., T}, respectively.
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(r) + Ĝ(r)xT + Λ̂
















, for i = 0, 1, 2, ..., n, (A.20)
where ĉ(r), Ĝ(r), Λ̂(r), Γ̂(r) are the bootstrap replication r of ĉ, Ĝ, Λ̂, Γ̂ as described in Section
A.2.

























, for i = 0, 1, 2, ..., n, (A.22)
4. Steps 1 − 3 are repeated for r = 1, 2, ..., R. Quantiles of xcT+h are estimated as quantiles of{
x
c,(r)




This appendix provides additional results on the choice of the global volatility measure (Section
B.1) and on the robustness of the threshold effects to the choice of the sample period (Section B.2).
B.1 Alternative Measures of Global Volatility
In addition to our preferred measure of global volatility, or grvet– given by (1)– , we consider the
realized volatility of the global equity returns, or rvget– given by (3)– , and the VIX index, vixt
(http://www.cboe.com/vix). The VIX index is available on the CBOE website from 1990.4 To
differentiate among these measures, we compute the average of the squared residuals (MSE) of the
threshold-augmented dynamic output growth models ∆yit = ci + ρi∆yit−1 + ϕizt−1(γ) + eit. We
plot the minimized values of MSE for different values of the threshold parameter (γ). We consider
indicator-specific grids of thresholds defined by the set Sπ,T = {j/T ;πmin < j/T < πmax}; namely,
the indicator-specific grid of thresholds is given by (1− π) quantiles of the given indicator, π ∈ Sπ,T .
Figure B.1 plots the MSEs for different values of π (j) using the full sample 1979Q2—2019Q4 for
grvet and rvget. To facilitate comparisons with the VIX index, Figure B.2 shows the MSEs for the
subsample 1990Q1—2019Q4, using all three global volatility measures. Each of these figures shows
the MSEs for the full set of economies, as well as the subsamples of advanced countries and emerging
markets. The results clearly show that the grvet measure performs best in terms of MSEs in all
cases considered, and is preferred over the other two measures. Note that the underlying regression
models contain the same number of estimated parameters and as a result the MSE outcomes across
4Historical VIX data can be downloaded from here. This data is subject to a change in methodology that
occured in September 22, 2003.
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the three measures are comparable. Therefore, we conclude that data speaks in favor of grvet,
which happened to be our choice based on our a priori arguments spelled out in the paper.
Figure B.1: MSE Objective Functions Using the 1979Q2—2019Q4 Subsample
(a) All Economies
(b) Advanced Economies (c) Emerging Economies
Notes: This chart shows average MSE of the threshold-augmented dynamic output growth models ∆yit =
ci + ρi∆yit−1 +ϕizt−1(γ) + eit estimated for the grid of threshold values (x-axis) for two choices of volatility
measures: grvet (solid blue line), and rvget (dotted orange line).
B.2 Robustness of Threshold Effects to the Choice of Sample Pe-
riod (1990Q1—2019Q4 Subsample)
We also investigate the robustness of our threshold effects to the choice of time period. To this
end we consider the sub-sample 1990Q1—2019Q4 which excludes the 1987 stock market crash whose
macroeconomic impact was rather short lived, avoids breaks in error variances due to the so called
“Great Moderation", and better captures the trade and financial market globalization of emerging
economies that gathered pace post 1990. The results, in Table B.1, show that in 16 advanced
economies and 5 emerging markets (out of 19 and 14 countries in each income group, respectively),
global volatility (grvet) (i.e., beyond the threshold γ) is associated with lower output growth
subsequently. While the estimate of γ remains unchanged, we are able to detect the presence of
threshold effects in a larger number of economies.
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Figure B.2: MSE Objective Functions Using the 1990Q1—2019Q4 Subsample
(a) All Economies
(b) Advanced Economies (c) Emerging Economies
Notes: This chart shows average MSE of the threshold-augmented dynamic output growth models ∆yit =
ci+ρi∆yit−1+ϕizt−1(γ)+eit estimated for the grid of threshold values (x-axis) for three choices of volatility
measures: grvet (solid blue line), rvget (dotted orange line) and vixt (dashed green line).
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Table B.1: Estimates of Threshold Coeffi cient ϕ, Threshold Parameter γ, and
AR(1) Coeffi cients in Threshold-augmented AR Specifications, 1990Q1—2019Q4
(a) Advanced economies: p̂ = 3.33% and γ̂adv = 0.156
ϕ̂ t-ratio ρ̂ t-ratio R̄2 σ̂2
Australia -0.0064† -2.18 0.08 0.92 3.3% 0.0058
Austria -0.0222‡ -4.93 -0.21† -2.39 16.1% 0.0081
Belgium -0.0128‡ -3.72 0.05 0.58 12.2% 0.0063
Canada -0.0101‡ -3.88 0.48‡ 6.37 38.9% 0.0049
Finland -0.0225‡ -3.28 0.12 1.26 11.8% 0.0125
France -0.0086‡ -3.49 0.29‡ 3.22 25.6% 0.0042
Germany -0.0195‡ -4.69 0.00 0.04 18.1% 0.0073
Italy -0.0129‡ -3.65 0.15 1.54 17.9% 0.0061
Japan -0.0133‡ -2.56 0.13 1.35 9.1% 0.0092
Korea -0.0110∗ -1.56 0.23† 2.50 7.3% 0.0134
Netherlands -0.0136‡ -5.01 0.34‡ 4.37 37.0% 0.0049
Norway -0.0131† -2.23 -0.29‡ -3.24 8.8% 0.0114
New Zealand -0.0003 -0.08 0.33‡ 3.69 9.2% 0.0069
Singapore -0.0121 -1.23 0.19† 2.06 5.0% 0.0182
Spain -0.0048‡ -2.38 0.70‡ 11.13 59.7% 0.0036
Sweden -0.0246‡ -4.29 -0.14 -1.51 12.3% 0.0102
Switzerland -0.0134‡ -3.49 0.08 0.89 11.3% 0.0071
United Kingdom -0.0084‡ -2.49 0.28‡ 2.99 18.2% 0.0059
United States -0.0118‡ -4.19 0.24‡ 2.65 26.9% 0.0049
MG (equally weighted) -0.0127‡ -9.02 0.16‡ 3.01
MG (PPP-GDP weighted) -0.0121‡ -14.75 0.21‡ 6.66
(b) Emerging economies: p̂ = 5.83% and γ̂eme = 0.129
ϕ̂ t-ratio ρ̂ t-ratio R̄2 σ̂2
Argentina -0.0089 -1.25 0.43‡ 5.27 19.3% 0.0183
Brazil -0.0091∗ -1.41 0.04 0.38 0.2% 0.0165
Chile -0.0104† -1.83 0.11 1.13 3.2% 0.0142
China 0.0033 0.73 0.18∗ 1.94 1.7% 0.0117
India -0.0056 -0.90 -0.22† -2.39 3.2% 0.0156
Indonesia -0.0060 -1.01 0.32‡ 3.61 9.5% 0.0153
Malaysia -0.0112† -1.87 0.22† 2.38 9.0% 0.0145
Mexico -0.0158‡ -3.01 0.16∗ 1.80 10.9% 0.0129
Peru -0.0121∗ -1.35 0.21† 2.35 4.3% 0.0231
Philippines -0.0042 -1.16 0.20† 2.22 4.7% 0.0091
South Africa -0.0027∗ -1.28 0.60‡ 8.08 37.7% 0.0053
Saudi Arabia -0.0027 -0.69 0.63‡ 9.15 40.9% 0.0101
Thailand -0.0325‡ -3.74 -0.07 -0.83 9.3% 0.0220
Turkey -0.0275‡ -2.60 -0.08 -0.84 4.1% 0.0268
MG (equally weighted) -0.0104‡ -4.04 0.19‡ 2.99
MG (PPP-GDP weighted) -0.0042 -1.15 0.12 1.63
Notes: Our threshold-augmented dynamic output growth model is given by∆yit = ci+ρi∆yit−1+ϕizt−1(γ)+
eit, where ∆yit is the first difference of the logarithm of real GDP in country i during quarter t and zt =
I(grvet > γ). I (A) is an indicator variable that takes the value of unity if event A occurs and zero otherwise.
grvet is a measure of global volatility defined by (1), and γ is the threshold parameter. The estimation sample
is 1990Q1 to 2019Q4. Statistical significance is denoted by ∗, † and ‡, at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
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C Counterfactual Analysis Using June-January IMF
Forecast Revisions
The IMF revised its growth forecasts down for most countries in June as the extent of the Covid-19
shock and its economic fallout became clearer. In this appendix, we use these updated forecasts
to gauge the size of the GDP shock arising from the Covid-19 pandemic. Let ∆gdpJunei,T+q be the
June 2020 IMF World Economic Outlook (WEO) GDP growth forecasts for country i in quarters
q = 1, 2, 3, 4 of 2020, and ∆gdpJani,T+q be the associated January 2020 IMF WEO forecasts. We
compute the June-January forecast revisions as
κi,q = ∆gdp
June
i,T+q −∆gdpJani,T+q, for q = 1, 2, 3, 4,
and i = 0, 1, 2, ..., n. Assuming that developments surrounding Covid-19 were the only dominant
developments behind the forecast revisions, we use κq = (κ1,q, κ2,q, ..., κn,q)
′, for q = 1, 2, 3, 4 to
infer ωT+q and repeat the counterfactual analysis in Section 3. The results are reported in Figures
C.1– C.3 and Table C.1. While the new estimates are qualitatively similar to those reported in the
main text, they indicate worse growth outcomes and longer recoveries quantitatively.
Table C.1: Growth Outcomes Following the Covid-19 Shock Using June-January
IMF Forecast Revisions (percent change)
Q4 over Q4
2019 2020 2021
Median 10th pctl Median 90th pctl 10th pctl Median 90th pctl
Advanced Economies 1.4 -8.9 -5.6 -2.1 2.0 4.9 7.7
United States 2.4 -13.2 -7.9 -2.5 -0.4 3.9 7.2
Euro Area 0.8 -9.8 -5.9 -1.4 3.5 6.8 10.4
France 1.0 -10.6 -6.3 -1.5 2.2 5.0 8.2
Germany 0.4 -11.7 -5.1 2.0 2.4 4.9 7.4
Italy 0.1 -12.7 -7.8 -2.3 2.0 5.8 10.1
Japan -0.5 -10.8 -4.0 3.0 1.3 5.0 9.0
United Kingdom 1.3 -11.9 -7.0 -1.9 0.8 4.3 6.9
Canada 1.5 -12.3 -7.1 -1.7 -1.6 4.9 10.9
Emerging Markets (excl. China) 3.0 -6.8 -0.5 6.0 2.8 5.9 9.1
Emerging Asia (excl. China) 4.6 -7.1 1.2 9.5 4.0 5.9 7.7
Latin America 0.5 -10.7 -2.8 5.5 0.4 6.2 11.7
China 6.1 2.7 9.2 15.3 4.5 7.7 11.3
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Figure C.1: The Impact of Covid-19 on Real GDP Using June-January IMF
Forecast Revisions (percent deviation from baseline)
World Advanced Economies Emerging Economies excl. China
China Euro Area United Kingdom
United States Advanced Asia Pacific Other Advanced Economies
Emerging Asia excl. China Latin America Other Emerging Economies
Notes: The impact is in percent and the horizon is quarterly. This figure plots quantiles of ηc (T, h) defined
by (29).
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Figure C.2: Dynamics of Real GDP Following the Covid-19 Shock Using June-
January IMF Forecast Revisions (in logs; 2019Q4=1)
China Euro Area
United States United Kingdom
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Figure C.3: Dynamics of Regions’Real GDP Following the Covid-19 Shock Using
June-January IMF Forecast Revisions (in logs; 2019Q4=1)
World Advanced Economies
Advanced Asia Pacific Other Advanced Economies
Emerging Economies excl. China Emerging Asia excl. China
Latin America Other Emerging Economies
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